Kierkgaard II: The Sequel by Magee, Paul
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C u ltural studies in cultural st u d i e s
In what follows, I want to discuss three audience responses to ‘Kierkegaard: The Movie’, a
paper I delivered at the Cultural Studies Association of Australia’s annual conference in
December 2001, and to show where those responses led me. The reason I am doing so is
that I am more and more convinced that our theories of ideology suffer a fundamental
f l a w. They fail to incorporate the richest source of data that we, as humanities academics,
have at our disposal: the fact that we are all teachers. What richer source could we have for
studying the transmission of ideas and beliefs than our own social practices? I am re f e rr i n g
not only to the classroom, but also to our conferences, and even to our collegial visits to the
pub. Wherever it is that university people garner new ideas and directions, that is where we
will be most likely to learn about the mechanisms of cultural and indeed political trans-
mission. So rather than set forth a new reading of Harold Garf i n k e l ’s Studies in Ethno -
m e t h o d o l o g y, I want to show how my new reading was generated in response to the comments
and critiques I received when I delivered my first Kierkegaard paper.1 The result will seem
chatty and informal and that is precisely my point because I’m using the data most re a d y
to hand to further the study of where ideas come from: people like us.
The main polemic thrust of my Kierkegaard paper was the claim that a radical academic
politics would, re g a rdless of left or right and other such group affiliations, involve opening
a space for new types of intellectual practices. I argued that cultural studies would have a
real (as opposed to just postulated) political impact if it saw as its charter to provide space
and facilities for otherwise unthinkable projects. For you cannot teach students how to learn
k i e r k e g a a rd I I
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by simply giving them facts. You have to provide an example of learning for them to emu-
late. In other words, teachers need to show the same radical openness to the new that they
wish to inculcate in their students, or they are simply not teaching. They can do so by sup-
p o rting, and allowing themselves to be engaged by, crazy projects: their own, or those of
others. That’s the world I want to be in. So if, in ‘Kierkegaard II: The Sequel’, I seek to docu-
ment how I learnt from enacting ‘Kierkegaard: The Movie’, and to think through how one
l e a rns from cultural events more bro a d l y, it’s with the aim of expanding the space of learn-
ing in general.
So, whatever happened to ‘Kierkegaard: The Movie’? I was on a panel of Derr i d e a n s
who all said nothing. I guess he hasn’t written a book on surfing yet. Not that I wanted to
minimise Derr i d a ’s influence on us in the Cultural Studies Association of Australia, but rather
to re d i rect it. For the truth of the matter is that the definition of revolution (‘taking ideas
as things to act first, and then theorise later’) and poetry, which I garn e red from Kierkegaard ’s
R e p e t i t i o n, and then sought to apply to Wagner while learning to surf in Corn w a l l , is less a
critique of Derr i d a ’s Of Grammatology than an explanation of its power.2 G r a m m a t o l o g y d o e s n ’t
tell us what deconstruction is, it just does it, smashing whole fields of knowledge with one
and the same exploding kernel of post-Saussurean insight, letting the ideas, term i n o l o g i e s ,
systematisations and so forth come later. Act the idea first, theorise it later (as perhaps happens
with all learn i n g ) .
Which brings me to my first respondent, who said something very similar. Amanda
MacDonald drew an analogy between the model of experimental practice set forth in my
‘ K i e r k e g a a rd: The Movie’ and her experience of foreign language teaching. Amanda arg u e d
that the teaching of language is fundamentally concerned with changes of mechanical prac-
tice and habit. It forces a radical altering of one’s habits of bodily association (sound pro-
duction, hearing, recognition of visual markers) and of intellectual association (new lexicons
and new grammars by which to link them), which is why learning a foreign language is both
so traumatic and so utterly liberating. It forces you to see if repetition is possible, to change
your daily motions, and so serves to generate new ideas and experiences.
Something in the links Amanda off e red between foreign language, trauma and change
i n s p i red me to bring my experience of learning and teaching into the space where I usually
consider politics and culture. I was interpellated to think through a new frame. And to re m e m-
ber that it was while I was studying Beginner’s French, a first-year subject, and round the
time of those two dance parties that I had my first experiences of gay sex—I have no idea
why I just wrote that. I was twenty-eight, already with MA and teaching experience. I turn e d
up as a student for my first class, an intensive summer-semester course, only to discover that
it was in fact located in the very room in which I had, only two months before, taught my
last class. I had been tutoring in a course devoted to the history of piracy. As you do. Suddenly
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I was on the other side of the desk. And getting ideas. All the while rehearsing for RED RAW:
A Revolutionary Dance Part y. And dragging up all my old Russian too. Experiencing ‘the trans-
f o rmation of metaphor into metamorphosis’ as the Russian linguist and émigré Roman Jakob-
son once phrased it, describing the practice of Velimir Khlebnikov, the great pre - re v o l u t i o n a ry
Russian poet.3
Stephen Muecke, to turn to my second interlocutor, responded to the paper by suggest-
ing that I had made a shift from the melancholy perspective of my earlier book, F rom Here
to Ti e rra del Fuego, which had sought to know the truth of the past of that little South Ameri-
can island and from there the rest of the world, through a massive Marxist apparatus.4 H a v i n g
launched that very book a few months earlier in Melbourne, Stephen proceeded to suggest
that I was now treating truth, or whatever functions in its place, as something that has its
home in the future. This suggestion suddenly crystallised in me the realisation that I had
indeed, as I grew older, shifted intellectual trajectories. Immediately I thought up an anal-
ogy of my own. My work on Kierkegaard suddenly, because of Stephen’s usage of the word
‘ f u t u re’, seemed directly linked to what I had been reading about Charles Sanders Peirc e ,
whose most compelling semiotic theses are, as Jakobson once remarked, concerned with the
f u t u re-orientation of meaning.5 As Peirce put it, the ‘meaning of every proposition lies in the
fu t u re ’ .6 This is because, now in Jakobson’s words, ‘the sign opens a path toward the indefinite
f u t u re, that is, it anticipates, it predicts, things to come’, and it does so on the basis of its
prior history of meaning.7 Yet that past history can never fully saturate a future one:
it is clear that the frame law is only a condition for all possible future occurrences [while] it
is in the context of each occurrence that the verbal invariant of the verbal sign—its gen-
eral meaning—acquires its new, particular meaning. The context is variable, and the par-
ticular meaning of the word undergoes renewal in each new context.8
And how is this all about learning? The analogies off e red by both Amanda and Stephen,
in response to my work, in fact served to generate new projects, this one included. And I
have been led to suggest, simply following the chain of my own associations, that these inter-
locutions (for it is the reality of change that I am attempting to track here, the creative power
of dialogue) had both a prospective and a re t rospective power. In hearing other people’s
analogies and metaphors for creative learning I was being directed back into my own most
intense experiences of newness, those times (and everyone has them) where one experiences
the ‘transformation of metaphor into metamorphosis’. Now I want to disrupt this narr a t i v e
to introduce the event that really sparked this writing.
The third of my respondents, John Fro w, suggested I think again. The problem, he arg u e d ,
with founding an academic discipline on the model of creative practice—the problem with,
in my words, ‘making Cultural Studies the experimental, which is to say, the radical wing of
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the humanities’, the problem with acting the idea first and theorising it later—is the pro b-
lem of institutionalisation.9 John didn’t refer to the Russian Revolution but rather the re c e n t
‘happenings’ of the 1960s. He said that my Kierkegaard paper had reminded him of Haro l d
G a rfinkel and ethnomethodology, the branch of sociology which Garfinkel named and so
invented. Garfinkel encouraged his students to perf o rm experiments in the disruption of
e v e ryday life. In one such experiment, students were asked to go home and act as if they
w e re lodgers. The reactions, variously intense and hostile, that this experiment elicited serv e d
to reveal the precarious, and in many ways invisible, sets of rules and regulations govern i n g
such seemingly natural practices as the family home. Such experiments, John said, were
obviously quite powerful and new, but the attempt to institutionalise them within the bure a u-
cratising context of university life was not a success. By the early 1980s Garf i n k e l ’s ideas had
been heavily criticised and were already becoming outmoded and unfashionable. How, John
asked me, do you institutionalise cre a t i v i t y, something inherently anti-institutional?
Is it possible to institutionalise creativity? Or is it only ever an accident in a world of re-
ification and re t rospectivity? My gut feeling, during that question session, was that there was
m o re to say on the topic, but I couldn’t find it.
I was a bit disconsolate at the fact that my triumphal and re v o l u t i o n a ry paper had a bit of
a hole in it. One of the things about doing experimental (fictocritical) writing is that people
d o n ’t often criticise it; they usually just ignore it. Perhaps some of the reason for writing in
a crazy way is to put yourself beyond critique. As in the dumb reason. It’s only the re a l
critics like Frow who will cut through the crap and treat your message for what it was: an
attempt to speak well. Thank God for our critics.
The discontinuous inst i t u t e
So, how do you institutionalise cre a t i v i t y, something that undermines, and makes subject to
time (we have no idea what the future is!) places that don’t want to be? A few months after
the conference, I stumbled across a paper by Harold Garfinkel titled ‘Practices for Follow-
ing Rules and Applying Instructions’ in The Penguin Modern Sociology Reader (ed. Peter
Wo r s e l e y, 1970, second-hand).1 0 The Reader f e a t u res on its cover two long-hairs (a tall male
with beard and scarf, and a woman with a fringe that comes down over her eyes) alongside
a close-cropped pinstriped business type. All three are Anglo. Next to the pin is a short Indian
male in a hound’s-tooth suit, with wide lapels and huge sideburns. The Penguin Modern Socio -
logy Reader is clearly out of date. Not to mention bizarre. For it features Garfinkel. And he is
out there. In his talk on rules and instructions Garfinkel argues that one finds ‘in the com-
plex of ord i n a ry, mundane accounts that there are practices for locating monsters but there
a re also practices for burying them. There are practices for refusing the existence 
of exceptions.’1 1
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A monster, it turns out, is a way to stuff up a list of rules and instructions. It’s the excep-
tion the rules have not covered. So if we are playing tick-tack-toe, and the rules say that ‘two
persons play’, a monster invokes questions such as ‘Any two persons? When, today? To m o r-
row? Do we have to be in sight of each other? Can we play by mail? Can one player be dead?’1 2
It rapidly becomes apparent that no set of rules or instructions, whatever the game, what-
ever the genre, or even institution, is ever exhaustive. As Garfinkel puts it, with some glee:
‘My classes can tell you that creating such problems is the easiest thing in the world’.1 3
Though that is an understatement. The following strikes me as pure genius. I mean, imagine
teaching your students to generate this little monster:
We sit down to play a game, and we decide that it is going to be chess. You make your move.
I take all of the pieces off the board, and I shake them up, and this may go on for three or
four minutes. Then I finish, and I put the pieces back on the board. The positions have
not been changed. Now the thing that is apt to happen is that the person grabs my arm and
asks, ‘What are you doing?’
I answer, ‘I’m playing chess.’
‘ Yo u ’ re not playing chess.’
‘Show me in the rule book where it’s not perm i t t e d . ’
‘All right, it’s not in the rule book. It’s still illegal. Why are you doing it?’
‘I find that whenever I  do it, I win.’
‘Oh, what a load of bunk that is. Nevetheless, don’t do it.’1 4
Such scenarios serve to reveal the ‘located character’ of the rules of chess, the fact that they
only make sense amid a further set of (invisible) rules and instru c t i o n s .
Weird science
Wild teaching. Wild implications. Of course, it didn’t survive. The sort of work Garf i n k e l
p romoted was clearly very dependent on his own personal lunacy. Once you lose such a per-
f o rm e r, you only with difficulty find others who are capable of a similar logical anarc h y.
G a rf i n k e l ’s is an example of a successful, but brief, personality politics. For as institutional
p o l i c y, it was doomed to fail. People don’t like to change their habits. However off i c i a l l y
radical, people, both within the university and outside it, are basically conservative. They
do not want the shock of the new to disrupt their breakfast. And lunch. And dinner. For
t h ree weeks. Of your kids pretending to be lodgers. I may sound a bit conservative myself
h e re, but I am trying to come to terms with Fro w ’s critique, with my own personal experience,
and with the actual fate of Garf i n k e l ’s work.
The trajectory I have been sketching led me from this particular chapter in The Penguin
M o d e rn Sociology Reader to Studies in Ethnomethodology, Garf i n k e l ’s most famous work. Fro m
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t h e re I turned to the various appreciations, debates and critiques to which that 1968 book
led and I’ll use some of these texts to outline further the issues Harold Garfinkel raises for
the questioning of ideology. A brief case study of the fate of Garf i n k e l ’s work, and the way
it was received in collegial spaces similar to ours, should help us to appreciate the possibilities
for enacting similarly crazy programs among us. This will also provide me with the space to
hone my answer to John Fro w ’s question: how do you institutionalise cre a t i v i t y ?
So what is ethnomethodology? Garfinkel begins Studies in Ethnomethodology by invoking
Emile Durkheim’s foundational characterisation of sociology as the discipline that studies
‘the objective reality of social facts’. He proceeds to assert that this facticity should not
simply be taken as a given. It is an ‘ongoing accomplishment’ of the various agents in a society
and needs to be analysed as such.1 5 The re s e a rch Garfinkel then sets forth aim to investigate
how the facts that make up social order are accomplished. That is, he analyses how people
render their lives ‘accountable’ to the various systems of authority they encounter, and
how they theorise what they are doing in the process. He does so through the study of cases
like that of Agnes, an intersex who wishes to pass as a woman.1 6 G a rfinkel treats Agnes’s
gender as her own perf o rmative ‘accomplishment’, and in the process allows room for agency
in a category that other sociologists would simply re g a rd as a given part of being born into
whichever particular society. This focus on the perf o rmance of one’s facts is evident in the
name Garfinkel gave the discipline, using the analogy of ethnobotany. Just as an ethnobotanist
studies the practice of plant labelling and usage within a given indigenous group, an ethno-
methodologist studies the practice of social-fact labelling and usage, that is, the methodol-
ogy through which a given group approaches its world. For Agnes is at once a re p re s e n t a t i v e
of a particular ethnos, the intersex, and a ‘practical scientist’, who necessarily theorises what
she is doing, if only so as to succeed at it.
The re s e a rch Garf i n k e l ’s new discipline led to was fundamentally descriptive, indeed, pro-
grammatically so. Garfinkel advised re s e a rchers to assume an attitude of ‘ethnomethod-
ological indiff e rence’ to the larger political and social categories (for example, class and
capital) of traditional social inquiry, all the more to open their eyes to lived categories of their
subjects. This ‘indiff e rence’, as I will show, has been cause for substantial critique. That noted,
t h e re is a clear, albeit unstated, political edge to ethnomethodology. As Michael Lynch, one
of Garf i n k e l ’s students, remarked, the very labelling of the discipline served to pro b l e m a t i s e
‘the division of labour between the social scientist and native practitioner’.1 7 After all, the
focus on a subject’s ‘perf o rmances of method’ could drive one to entertain a certain theatri-
c a l i t y, or perf o rm a t i v i t y, in one’s reading of the social scientist’s factual ‘accomplishments’ 
as well.1 8 In other words, it could lead you to ‘question the very foundations of social 
science knowledge’.1 9 Maybe it is just one knowledge, among others. Maybe there are 
scientists every w h e re .
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Clearly there are parallels to cultural studies here, in the multiple ontologies such a pro-
gram implicitly postulates for the various groups in society, and the desire to re g a rd those
g roups’ epistemologies as equally significant to those of the academic sciences. That said,
how many of us actually teach our students to dump the Cultural Studies Reader and instead
l e a rn about the ‘ “seen but unnoticed” background of common understandings’ all aro u n d
them, by engaging in the ‘demonstrations’ that will serve to reveal it? How many of us stand
behind the lectern encouraging students to bargain in shops with fixed prices, to perf o rm
the lodger experiment on their parents (who might complain to the university about the dis-
ruption this causes), or to insist, the next time they speak to a friend, on explanations for
the meaning of common phrases?
Let me turn to some of Garf i n k e l ’s critics. Sarah Bailyn, in the course of her recent art i c l e
‘Who Makes the Rules? Using Wittgenstein in Social Theory’, seeks to show the pro b l e m s ,
both philosophical and political, innate to Garf i n k e l ’s approach to ‘ru l e s ’ .2 0 Bailyn re m i n d s
us of Garf i n k e l ’s desire in founding ethnomethodology to avoid the sort of sociology that
p resented its subjects as ‘judgemental dopes’, that is, as little more than mouthpieces of
the social stru c t u res (for example, working class culture) and orders into which they are
b o rn. Given it is continually achieved, ‘social order is contingent in ethnomethodology. It is
not a foregone conclusion.’2 1 Yet for Bailyn, who writes in the poststructuralist tradition of
the latter Wi t t g e n s t e i n ,2 2 G a rf i n k e l ’s desire to show his subjects’ agential role in perf o rm-
ing the social facts of their existence is defeated by the conformist view of society his work
actually pre s u p p o s e s :
G a rf i n k e l ’s famous ‘breaching’ experiments for example, d e p e n d e d on the part i c i p a n t s
sharing assumptions … which the students would then deliberately break in order to see
what happened. These experiments would not have worked so well among participants who
did not share assumptions with one another.2 3
Bailyn compares her own lived experience of the multiplicity of social orders to highlight
G a rf i n k e l ’s ‘lack of consideration of subgroups in society, or meanings which are not share d
amongst all members of a community’.2 4 Going to the bank, for instance, involves her in a
multiplicity of rule systems and language games, where a s
the homeless man sitting outside the bank, hoping people will give him a few coins while
their wallets are open, clearly does not have the same meaning/use of the banking system.
It does not form part of his social stru c t u re in the same way.2 5
Embracing Wi t t g e n s t e i n ’s call to avoid treating concepts like ‘society’ as metaphysical entities,
Bailyn suggests that the ‘background of common understandings’, which Garfinkel claims
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his experiments reveal, is one such metaphysical entity.2 6 The very idea of ‘common
understandings’ collapses the multiplicity of societies within any one society into the fan-
tasy of one. Garfinkel simply assumes that what his experiments reveal to be true of one
member of his society will there f o re apply to all members of that society. This assumption
e ffectively does make ‘judgemental dopes’ of them all.
B a i l y n ’s critique certainly seems valid and appropriate to the evidence she cites. But her
citations are selective. It’s not simply that she ignores the accounts, in Studies in Ethno -
m e t h o d o l o g y, of people like Agnes. She ignores moments within the very chapters she cites.
For the Garfinkel who invokes the ‘background of common understandings’ in Chapter 2,
‘Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities’, proceeds, in that same chapter, to
analyse the ‘re t ro s p e c t i v e - p rospective’ nature of meaning.
In one of his famous experiments, Garfinkel encouraged his students to interro g a t e
their subjects on the meaning of common phrases that arose in the course of conversation.
Consider the following transcript:
On Friday night my husband and I were watching television. My husband remarked that he
was tired. I asked, ‘How are you tired? Physically, mentally, or just bore d ? ’
(Subject) I don’t know, I guess physically, mainly.
(E) You mean that your muscles ache, or your bones?
(S) I guess so. Don’t be so technical.
(After more watching)
(S) All these old movies have the same kind of old iron bedstead in them.
(E) What do you mean? Do you mean all old movies, or some of them, or just the ones
you have seen?
(S) What’s the matter with you? You know what I mean.
(E) I wish you would be more specific.
(S) You know what I mean. Drop dead!
By derailing a typical exchange, the transcript forces us to think through what usually take
place. Usually, one sutures over potential idiosyncrasies and exceptions on the grounds that
the subject saying t h i s (‘All these old movies’, which if taken as a universal judgement is
obviously absurd) must have actually meant to say t h a t (‘the ones I’ve seen’). By interro g a t i n g
their subjects on matters of meaning that we would usually either assume or allow to emerg e
in the course of the conversation, Garf i n k e l ’s students demonstrated that in conversing, one
is always ‘waiting for something later in order to see what was meant before ’ .2 7 C o m m o n
understandings are re t rospectively imparted, for common understanding—meaning itself—
comes from the future and after the bre a c h .
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T h a t ’s why the students’ victims get so annoyed: if you question them on the meaning of
statements that seem perfectly obvious, you are actually forcing them to articulate their
reliance on the fantasy (one of our deepest—‘You know what I mean’) that we all speak the
same language. We rely on this fantasy simply so as to speak. Yet it’s an ‘accomplishment’
much more than a given, and, in this respect at least, it’s like any other practice of ru l e
f o l l o w i n g .
Not only do we suture over breaches to create ord e r, but the existence of a breach often
in itself creates ord e r. A breaching experiment often causes its subjects to articulate, and at
times create, rules that might not actually hold sway, or be so widely held, otherwise. We see
the order of a set of ‘common understandings’ in the past precisely because it’s just been
s h a t t e red, which is how we are tricked into thinking it was ‘always-already’ there. How
else are we to understand the extraord i n a ry power of Derr i d a ’s Of Grammatology, which func-
tioned not merely to shatter the corpus of structuralist knowledge, but to promulgate a set
of rules as to how that corpus should be read? Since Derrida we have had one stru c t u r a l i s m ,
which, ranging from Claude Lévi-Strauss to Roman Jakobson, has been seen to suffer in 
all its parts from the same fundamental flaw Derrida diagnosed in it. Assessments of ‘the
s t ructuralist era’ come from the future, and after the breach, where they turn into habits and
p u r p o rt to tru t h .
To talk of ‘the post-structuralist order’ in these terms brings out the real issue raised by
B a i l y n ’s work: there are places and periods in which creative acts, such as Garf i n k e l ’s bre a c h-
ing experiments or Chisholm’s dance party or Derr i d a ’s G r a m m a t o l o g y, serve to elicit the new,
and there are those in which they give birth, if they arise at all, either to re p ression or—
p e rhaps through the sheer multiplicity of language games on offer—to indiff e rence. Myself,
I think the move in Bailyn’s article from the supposedly closed systems of Garfinkel and
Anthony Giddens (her other subject, whom she attacks with greater accuracy) to the con-
cluding picture of a society of multiple and incommensurable practices (not just meanings,
à la Derrida, but practices, usages of meaning) is really very powerfully creative. It destro y s
‘society’ and certainly changed my day, however much I think it mangles old Garf i n k e l ’s
(though in a way it really just re s u rrects his project, which is why I like it). Clearly it’s possible
within poststructuralism actually to be poststru c t u r a l i s t .
Jakobson writes profoundly of the diminution of creative possibility in his 1930 essay 
‘On a Generation that Squandered its Poets’, which should one day be re g a rded as the found-
ing text of a science that analyses the possible conditions of creative acts.2 8 Eulogising the
recently suicided poet Vladimir Mayakovsky, Jakobson sets forth the clearly suicidal strains
within Mayakovsky’s writing, tendencies apparent even before the revolution, and the cre a t i v e
re p ression it eventually heralded (‘Hadn’t I better just/ let a bullet mark the period of my
s e n t e n c e ’ ) .2 9 He sets these strivings alongside an account of the increasing impossibility
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within a Stalinising Soviet Union for those of the 1890s generation to live out their cre a t i v i t y
(‘a generation’, now in 1930, ‘allotted the morose feat of building without song … im-
poverished in the most real sense of the word ’ ) .3 0
H ow do you inst i t u t i o nalise creat i v i t y ?
I’ll turn to the second critique of Garf i n k e l ’s work that I want to consider, that of Anthony
Giddens. Giddens discusses, and eventually dismisses, ethnomethodology in the course of
his 1993 New Rules of Sociological Method.3 1 Unlike Bailyn’s, his critique shows an aware n e s s
of the multiple rationalities Garfinkel did indeed postulate for the various e t h n o i he studied.3 2
Yet Giddens accuses Garfinkel of totalising the field all the same. The problem, Giddens
writes, is in ethnomethodology’s assumption that it is the desire for accountability that drives
social actors:
identifying rationality with ‘accountability’ cuts off the description of acts and communi-
cations from the analysis of purposive or motivated conduct, the strivings of actors to re a l i s e
definite interests … ‘doing bureaucracy ’, ‘doing nuclear physics’ … ‘[d]oing a social prac-
tice’ is much more than rendering it accountable, and this is precisely what makes it an
a c c o m p l i s h m e n t.3 3
Again this seems quite a valid critique. One could attempt to obviate it through psycho-
analytic theory, taking accountability as a re f e rence to the superego and the reality principle
i n t e rtwined in it. For ‘the prohibition of incest is nothing other than the sine qua non of
s p e e c h ’ .3 4 In speaking, one simultaneously passes into the register of prohibition that pro-
vides expression (as the inverse possibility which any prohibition brings to light), and indeed
being, to desire. That is, the act of speaking reality (say, in a scientific re p o rt) is at once a re n-
dering of accounts to the superego, and the various social agencies in which we incarn a t e
it (for example, one’s scientific peers), and at the same time shot through with ‘purposive or
motivated conduct’, shot through with ‘strivings … to realise definite interests’, shot thro u g h ,
that is, with unconscious desire. One could argue in this way, and so ignore Lacan’s own
comments as to the metaphysical stupidity of psychoanalytic theory, its subordinacy to, and
often detrimental effect upon, the practice of intersubjective intervention, which practice in
the psychoanalytic clinic in fact involves. Myself, I prefer to follow Lacan here .
I accept Giddens’s critique. What I want to do, on the contrary, is focus on the agenda that
drives it. I want to focus on the set of ‘accomplishments’ that Giddens wants to pre s e rve fro m
G a rf i n k e l ’s radical levelling of scientific and practical rationalities under the rubric of ‘account-
ability’. One is the accomplishment of the scientist. From asserting the inadequacy of the
concept of ‘accountability’ to comprehend agential strivings, Giddens moves straight to an
analysis of ethnomethodology’s inadequacy to validate any sort of knowledge claims. Given,
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Giddens argues, that ethnomethodology can itself be seen as just one more theatre for the
p e rf o rmance of accountability, shouldn’t one assume an attitude of ‘ethnomethodological
i n d i ff e rence’ to its claims too (just as one assumed it in relation to the class and capital
accounts of orthodox sociologists?).3 5 Its findings will then seem no more valid than that
of any other practice, something one might want to celebrate in postmodern style. But
how do you then deal, as Giddens now asks us to, with the status of mathematical knowl-
edge, the fact that it’s pretty hard to relativise, or for that matter deconstruct, ‘2 × 2 = 4’.3 6
It is interesting to see Giddens move so swiftly from a critique of ‘accountability’ qua a g e n t i a l
strivings to a critique of it qua t ruth-functional knowledge claims, something he wants to
allow not merely in mathematics, but—by reflection from the mathematical case—in the
social sciences too. The swift move is interesting, for the critique of accountability in term s
of purposiveness seems a clear re f e rence to the realm of politics. Guessing at the agenda
driving Giddens here, I think he is actually getting at the political function of objective
analyses of social facts like class, capital, structuration and so forth. I think he is suggest-
ing that in abandoning truth-functional knowledge, ethnomethodology effectively abandons
politics. I may be wrong in my reading of Giddens, of course, for these connections are by
no means explicit.
As for the explicit critique, it seems quite a valid one. It raises issues. Only those issues
have less to do with Garfinkel than with poststructuralism more generally. For the funny
thing is that, however much Giddens’s critiques might relate to some of Garf i n k e l ’s pro-
grammatic statements, when you look into the archive of ethnomethodological investiga-
tions you realise that these re s e a rches are actually very empirical, and in that sense thoro u g h l y
t ruth-functional. Take the 1981 article Garfinkel wrote with Michael Lynch and Eric
Livingston, ‘The Work of a Discovering Science Construed with Materials from the Optically
D i s c o v e red Pulsar’.3 7 It focuses on the ‘quiddities’ of the astrophysical discovery it observ e s ,
and gives appendices, where you find taped conversation transcripts, logbook entries and
even the scientific article in which the discovery was originally communicated.3 8 I t ’s hard l y
Jean Baudrillard. As Gerald Holton remarks, in his comments on the paper at the confere n c e
w h e re the Pulsar paper was delivered, ‘Garfinkel … first and foremost … is an empiricist,
a type re g a rded by some as dangero u s ’ .3 9 G a rf i n k e l ’s colleague Michael Lynch, who also
characterises himself as an empiricist, argues that the
c l a i m in ethnomethodology—a fallible and arguable claim in particular cases—is that the
phenomena studied furnish interpretative insight as well as materials for investigation.4 0
In other words, it’s an empiricism that discovers not merely social facts in the texture of
others’ realities but conceptual categories as well. Though it stays within the knowledge pro-
tocols (for example, f a l l i b i l i t y, Popper’s criterion for scientific re s p e c t a b i l i t y, which is even
1 2 4 V O L U M E1 0 N U M B E R2 S E P2 0 0 4
csr10.2-114-131  3/11/05  4:47 PM  Page 124
re g a rded as conservative by some) of academic practice. We are hardly tumbled into the epis-
temological ‘abyss’ Giddens derives from all this. Of course he is relying on Garf i n k e l ’s rather
fuzzy theoretical statements as to accountability and ontology, rather than the re c o rd of what
re s e a rch the latter has actually done.4 1 That Giddens has really missed the point here is
a p p a rent the moment you consider that much of the critique of Garfinkel has focused on his
v e ry empiricism, a charge made on the grounds (very familiar to cultural studies academics,
who tend, by and large, to empiricism too) that he concerns himself only with trivial and
insignificant re a l i t i e s .4 2
At this point I want to shift from an account of Giddens’s criticisms to a consideration of
the real question they bring to the table. How can the re p resentation of objective reality con-
stitute a political project? What can empirically based ethnomethodological accounts of the
methodology by which coroners perf o rm their investigations after ‘sudden, unnatural death’
(to mention one of Garf i n k e l ’s queerer studies)4 3 have to offer the very serious, diff i c u l t
and protracted struggles over issues at the centre of contemporary political life, both in Aus-
tralia and worldwide? In asking this, I am implicitly asking about the politics of this very
paper of mine, this cultural study in cultural studies, with its account of the practice and
p roduction of cultural studies: the teaching, the conferences, the formal and informal inter-
actions (and how do you institutionalise creativity?). What’s the point? How can a descrip-
tion of reality in itself be re v o l u t i o n a ry? How can it help to institutionalise cre a t i v i t y ?
The radicalism of this proposal (that a description of reality might itself foster change and
c reativity) is—like Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, like Bailyn’s essay cited
above, like Garf i n k e l ’s work—predicated on the belief that first, a multiplicity of worlds/
readings are in existence at any given moment, and second, they can be translated into the
p re s e n t .4 4 So Garfinkel would remind us, in arguing that the
f o rmula ‘The objective reality of social facts is sociology’s fundamental principle’ is heard by
p rofessionals, according to occasion, as a definition of association members’ activities, as
their slogan, their task, aim, achievement, brag, sales pitch, justification, discovery, social
phenomenon or re s e a rch constraint.4 5
G a rfinkel reminds us that there are innumerable possibilities—call them ontologies—
within the reality of that very formula. All are real, and any one can be translated into the
p resent. That’s the ‘objective reality’ of the concept ‘objective reality’, its own historicity as a
concept that has been historically received in all these diff e rent ways. I have tried to bro a c h
a similar phenomenon, in my cultural study of a cultural studies conference and its eff e c t s
(one of which was my incitement, by John Fro w, to read all this Garfinkel). One can see
the discipline as a radical practice of dialogue, exchange and learning, precisely by choosing
to focus on the facts of its conferencing activities, rather than the ideas in its journ a l
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publications, which are pretty meagre in comparison. By focusing on a particular one of its
realities (‘a past deferred to the future’, a ‘re v o l u t i o n a ry utopia’), one attempts to sway the
discipline to become more that way inclined. For describing reality can be a very political
act indeed. It can be a form, as Gramsci reminds us, of govern m e n t a l i t y.
So, Garf i n k e l ’s focuses our reading of the objective reality of rules and instructions on one
of that field’s particular realities (namely, their pro c e d u res for dealing with exceptions—‘All
right, it’s not in the rule book. It’s still illegal.’) and not on others (for example, the contri-
butions rules make to the causes of peace and harm o n y, which are real, and can be docu-
mented). In doing this, he opens our eyes to the cracks within the various systems all aro u n d
us. He effectively gives us a primer for how to stuff up lists of rules and instructions, even
though he never directs us to do so. He gives us an example. That can be an enorm o u s l y
political thing to do.
Look at the preface to Studies in Ethnomethodology, where we read (recalling the ‘monsters’,
‘practices of etc’, ‘ad hoc’ …) an acknowledgment that ‘David Sudnow worked to the limit
of his patience to improve the writing’.4 6 Why don’t commentators notice these things? Instead
we have Bailyn criticising the inadequate poststructuralism of Garf i n k e l ’s work, Giddens
attacking its inadequate structuralism. They can’t both be right. Or rather, they should re a l i s e
that they can. In Giddens’s case, it’s right there on the page. Attempting to recount Garf i n k e l ’s
views on the diff e rence between the practical and the academic scientist, Giddens on one
page describes how Garfinkel re g a rds scientists as practitioners of a ‘context free’ rationality
(which is why their findings are irrelevant to the majority of the populace, who always speak
c o n t e x t u a l l y ) .4 7 A few pages later we read Giddens’s critique of Garf i n k e l ’s eradication of the
d i ff e rence between practical and academic science, with no re f e rence to the prior and con-
t r a d i c t o ry characterisation of his views. In truth, both characterisations are valid. It is amusing
to read Giddens add the caveat that ethnomethodology ‘cannot readily be evaluated as a whole’
because of the clear diff e rences between the views of its founder and those of his followers.4 8
Reading Garfinkel to the letter will involve re t u rning to the exegetical process I enacted
above. That is, it will serve to re t u rn me to the historical trajectory of this paper, which is on
its way to an answer to Fro w ’s question (but how do you institutionalise creativity?), an
answer that will involve a focus on the letter of that very question. But first, before re t u rn-
ing to the world, a comment about science—which might, as I’ve begun to suggest, be noth-
ing other than just such a re t u rn .
What cultural studies lacks is a conception of itself as an experimental science. I’ve sug-
gested some parallels between cultural studies and ethnomethodology above. What emerg e s
f rom this, for me, is the comparative quietness of the work we produce, which seems to con-
ceive itself as the analysis of (social and theoretical, but don’t confuse the two!) texts,
much more than the transmission, perf o rmance or elicitation of knowledge. The same
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with our treatment of theory. There was an interesting discussion on the CSAA website a
number of years ago, where various people were asked to name what they saw as the canon
of cultural studies texts. Some provided such a list, some rejected the validity of canonisa-
tion altogether, and some discussion ensued.4 9 The question of our role in the transmission
of knowledge certainly emerged here, which I think is a healthy sign. But it’s tame compare d
to Garfinkel. His way of problematising the canon was to make problems for it, by encour-
aging his students to take the canon of phenomenological literature and to ‘misread’ it, with-
out specifying what that might mean.5 0
By encouraging people actually to produce knowledge in the world, Garfinkel might be
seen to be departing from the realm of academic knowledge. One could read this along 
the lines of the opposition set up in Marx ’s ever-quoted eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: ‘The
philosophers have only i n t e r p re t e d the world, in various ways; the point is to c h a n g e i t ’ .5 1 S o
we could say that Garfinkel, in inducing his students to misread the canon, dared to leave
traditional knowledge protocols behind. We could say that he exchanged knowledge for
action. For obviously politics and knowledge are opposed. Louis Althusser reads matters
o t h e rwise: ‘The theoretical revolution announced in thesis XI is in reality the foundation
of a new science’.5 2 A l t h u s s e r ’s lead encourages me in my suspicion that actually, that famous
eleventh thesis needs to be read in the light of the second, which holds—a far more pro-
found formulation—that ‘Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and the power, the
this-sidedness of his thinking in practice’.5 3 In other words, our thinking must involve inter-
vening in the world in such a way that reality itself evidences its proof and power. Which
is basically what Lenin did in Russia. ‘For me’, he is re p o rted to have told a visitor, just after
the revolution, ‘theory is only a hypothesis, not the Holy Scripture; it is a tool in our daily
w o r k ’ .5 4 Of course, any physical scientist would say the same. Such a forw a rd - t h i n k i n g
orientation is reflected in Althusser’s thesis, in ‘Lenin and Philosophy’, that ‘science is the
real itself, known by the action which reveals it’.5 5
Science, in such formulations, is less a corpus of stable knowledge, than a set of inter-
ventionist practices whose validity is known, indeed proven, by their effects. This has all
s o rts of implications for how we understand not merely Garf i n k e l ’s, but Althusser’s work
too. A scientific act of teaching, to translate one such implication, is one that takes aim
and manages to convert an entire generation to thinking through its own agenda. That would
be ‘the reality and power’, the scientific status, of Althusser’s teaching and collegial work with
Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Pierre Machere y, Jacques
Alain Miller, Jean Claude Milner and others, work whose effects we still feel now in the con-
t e m p o r a ry Australian university. If such formulations of science seem extreme in their prag-
matism and worldliness, it is worth remembering that Peirce, who was no re v o l u t i o n a ry,
would understand scientific investigation under the same pragmatic rubric: as an
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i n t e rventionist practice that is judged by its effects on the world. Of course, one might want
to consider just how far to extend this definition of ‘science’ (again, keeping in mind Bailyn’s
caveat against metaphysicalising concepts such as ‘creativity’, ‘rules’, ‘science’ and ‘society’)
and which histories one will attempt to deactivate in the process. But compare the opposite,
the diminishing of science evident in comments such as those of Forgacs, who argues that
the English reception of Gramsci was long delayed, for Gramsci only ever appeared in the
f o rm ‘sanitised by Althusserian scientism’.5 6 I s n ’t it rather science itself that is sanitised in
such formulations, which fail to see just what a political power a scientific attitude has the
potential to be? But then, as Althusser put it, ‘Lenin is i n t o l e r a b l e to academic philosophy’
and perhaps always will be.5 7 And this is not without reason. Empiricism is not only, to re p e a t
H o l t o n ’s words, ‘re g a rded by some as dangerous’. In certain hands, it is dangero u s !
I s n ’t that why Garfinkel himself seems so sanitised in critiques of his work, which focus
on an abstracting account of his ‘ideas’ and simply ignore the to-the-letter account of their
practice? He’s too full on. That’s why ethnomethodology fell into disrepute and dismissal, to
the point where Lynch finds himself, in an article aimed at celebrating the status of H u m a n
S t u d i e s as ‘Ethnomethodology’s Unofficial Journal’, compelled to spend most of his editorial
defending the discipline from critiques such as Giddens’s, or dismissals in Nicholas Aber-
c rombie, Stephen Hill and Brian S. Tu rn e r ’s D i c t i o n a ry of Sociology, which gives the fact
that ethnomethodology ‘deals with trivial subjects’ as the first in the reasons for its decline.5 8
Is it really the t r i v i a l i t y (of, for example, observing and exegeting police interrogation prac-
tices) that brought ethnomethodology into disrepute? Isn’t the real reason that this sort of
i n q u i ry is not trivial enough? It’s way too full on! This sort of stuff is dangerous. People might
get ideas. They might start experimenting on our lives too. We have no idea what the future
is. Act the idea first, theorise it later.
I am suggesting that what was truly radical in ethnomethodology was its scientific method.
You are not meant to act scientifically when it comes to the sort of subjects Garfinkel tre a t e d .
His approach was (according to unwritten institutional rules, but whose? and do they re a l l y
hold?) simply wrong, a misreading of science. To be scientific in such instances i s to be
c reative. Q: So how do you institutionalise creativity? A: You start by realising that actually
it didn’t disappear. There in the text of Fro w ’s own response to my paper, recalling and re a d-
ing it now to the letter, was a description of precisely what I have claimed Garf i n k e l ’s
critics try to make disappear: this crazy empiricism, these radical examples.
The unconscious inst i t u t e
In conclusion, Garfinkel stresses that there is no corrective dimension to any of his re s e a rc h e s .
He is n o t t rying to show people ways in which they could make their following of ru l e s
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and instructions easier by eradicating all the ‘monsters’. For the fact of the matter is that if
you excluded such strategies, ‘this would leave you without an enterprise’.5 9 He simply off e r s
a picture of how rules and regulations function for the people who follow them. He’s simply
being scientific. I am attempting a similar project here, in tracing the evolution of a set of
ideas from the giving of a paper, to the responses it garners, and on to the new ideas these
lead to. That’s my way into the theory of ideology. Of course, the critique of triviality could
still apply to this very essay, just as to Garf i n k e l ’s works, just as to cultural studies in gen-
eral. For none of these projects seem to concern the great questions of power: nation,
state, capital. Nor do cultural studies of Kylie Minogue fans (of which I am one). Now let me
answer John Fro w ’s question: how do you institutionalise cre a t i v i t y, something inhere n t l y
anti-institutional? How do you avoid just doing another Garfinkel, and fading into obscurity?
How can you maintain, and make standard, the sort of newness I wanted to champion in
that earlier paper, ‘Kierkegaard: The Movie’?
My bre a k t h rough with Garfinkel—about a year or so after ‘Kierkegaard: The Movie’, per-
colating through Amanda’s and Stephen’s comments, resonating with John’s critique, and
then bouncing off an accidentally discovered and out-of-date edition of one of Garf i n k e l ’s
own essays—was my realisation that Garfinkel may well have failed to institute
ethnomethodology within the academy, but there I was reading about it. There was John
F row telling me about it, passing on the example. Even my canonical D i c t i o n a ry of Sociology,
which lists all the problems with and critiques of Garfinkel, still couldn’t help passing on the
w o n d e rful lodger experiment. I started to realise, after a year of thinking intermittently about
G a rfinkel, that actually, he had managed to form an institution. We’d all ‘let it pass’. Who’s
to say that that is not an institution, something that stands through the passage of time? After
all, you’re reading about it now. It’s just been republished. Off i c i a l l y. Just as it was when Fro w
spoke about it in public to forty people in Hobart, others of whom might have gone and
chased it up too. It bribes its way into publication through us. Off i c i a l l y. As a favour perh a p s .
And it could become new. Every time.
As such, Garf i n k e l ’s work constitutes an institution, a discontinuous institute, whose exist-
ence, through repeated retellings, serves to stage by providing an example for intellectual
c re a t i v i t y.
A: You institutionalise creativity first by realising that it’s happening or could happen all
a round you, it’s just a matter of focusing. Realising the relative freedom of living in the future ,
which does not exist, you promote those realities over others. You translate them. You do
it by asking good questions—and here I assume the existence of spaces open enough to allow
this, something which is by no means guaranteed and has to be fought for.
— — — — — — — — — —
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